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Abstract: The paper analyzes reputation eﬀects in general perturbed
repeated games with discounting. If there is some positive prior probability
that one of the players is committed to play the same (pure or mixed) action
in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium payoﬀ in
all Nash equilibria. This bound is tight and independent of what other types
have positive probability. It is generally lower than Fudenberg and Levine’s
(1989, 1992) bound for games with a long-run player facing a sequence of
short-run opponents. The bound cannot be improved by considering types
playing history dependent commitment strategies.
Keywords: Reputation, Folk Theorem, repeated games, incomplete in-
formation.
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This paper analyzes reputation eﬀects in general perturbed repeated games with discount-
ing. If there is some positive prior probability that one of the players is committed to play
the same action in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium pay-
oﬀ in all Nash equilibria. Considering all (pure and mixed) actions of the stage game, we
derive the highest such lower bound. This bound is tight and independent of what other
types have positive probability. We also show that this bound cannot be improved by
considering types playing more complicated, history dependent, commitment strategies.
Our bound is described and explained intuitively in the second half of this introduction.
The idea that a small amount of incomplete information in a repeated game can
lead to predictions quite diﬀerent from those in the corresponding complete information
game has received much attention since the analysis of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and
Wilson (1982). They showed that if the ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma is perturbed
such that there is a small probability that one of the players is a type who always plays
the tit-for-tat strategy then there will be cooperation in all but a bounded number of
periods in any sequential equilibrium. Unfortunately, this result does depend critically
on the precise form of perturbation. The Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
demonstrates that any individually rational and feasible payoﬀ vector can be sustained
as an equilibrium outcome if the modeler chooses the “right” incomplete information.
Recently, however, such “reputation” arguments have been shown to lead to sharp
predictions in a more robust fashion: Aumann and Sorin (1989) allow for the existence of
many diﬀerent types which play like automata with bounded recall. They study repeated
common interest games and show that if there exists a type for each player who always
plays the cooperative action, then, no matter what other automata are around, the payoﬀs
of all pure strategy Nash equilibria will be close to the cooperative outcome.
Fudenberg and Levine (1989,92) impose no restriction at all on what types may have
positive probability, and prove a remarkably strong result for games in which a long-lived
player faces a sequence of short-lived opponents. Consider the strategy to which the long-
lived player would most like to publicly commit herself, i.e., the strategy that maximizes
her payoﬀ subject to the constraint that the short-lived players will choose a best response
1against it. If there exists a “commitment type” who always plays this strategy and if the
long-run player is suﬃciently patient, then she will get at least her “commitment payoﬀ”
in any Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed) of the game. Again, this result is independent
of what other types may have positive probability.
Schmidt (1993a) generalizes this result to a class of games with two long-lived players,
refered to as “games of conﬂicting interests”. These are deﬁned as having stage games
in which the pure strategy to which, say, player one would most like to publicly commit
herself holds the other player down to his minmax payoﬀ. If there is some prior proba-
bility that player one is a type committed to this strategy, then, as player one becomes
more patient, there is a lower bound on her Nash equilibrium payoﬀ converging to the
commitment payoﬀ. Moreover it is shown that for any stage game not of this class the
result does not hold, that is, there are equilibria which give player one a payoﬀ bounded
below her commitment payoﬀ no matter how patient she is.
In the current paper we examine two questions arising from this literature. First, is
there a lower bound (higher than the minmax payoﬀ) in repeated games that are not of
conﬂicting interests? We derive such a bound for general stage games. This bound is tight
in the sense that for any given prior probability of the commitment type equilibria exist
with an equilibrium payoﬀ arbitrarily close to the bound. In games of conﬂicting interests
the bound is equal to the commitment payoﬀ. We also generalize Schmidt’s result by
allowing for commitment types who play the same mixed strategy in each period. Thus,
our results can be applied to games with moral hazard and unobservable strategies.
Secondly, we ask whether types committed to playing more complicated strategies,
such as tit-for-tat, might provide a better lower bound than a simple commitment type.
We allow for types playing any pure strategy that can be implemented by a ﬁnite au-
tomaton. It is shown that our lower bound cannot be improved. Hence, if a player could
create some uncertainty about her type in the mind of her opponent, she could do no
better than make her opponent believe that she might be a particular commitment type
playing the same action each period.
In the following we describe in more detail the bound that we derive, and give some
intuition for it. Our argument builds on a basic statistical result which has been estab-
2lished by Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 92). If, say, player one “mimics” a commitment
type by always taking the commitment action, then in equilibrium player two can ex-
pect the commitment action not to be played with more than a given probability only
a bounded number of times. This number does not depend upon the particular Nash
equilibrium which is being played, nor on the discount factors of the two players. It is
simply implied by the fact that player two uses Bayes’ rule to update his beliefs about
player one’s type. Now suppose (as Fudenberg and Levine do) that the stage game is
played repeatedly by a patient player one against a sequence of short-lived players two.
In each period the respective short-lived opponent will play a best response against the
expected action of player one. Hence, if player one always plays the commitment action,
the number of times that a short-lived player two does not play a best response must be
bounded, because players two eventually become convinced that the commitment action
will be played in each period. Thus, if player one is suﬃciently patient she can guarantee
herself a payoﬀ very close to the commitment payoﬀ by simply mimicking this strategy.
This gives Fudenberg and Levine’s lower bound for any Nash equilibrium.
This argument does not work, however, when player two is long-lived and cares about
future payoﬀs. The reason is that even if the opponent is convinced that the commitment
action is very likely to be played next period, he will not want to play a best response to it,
if by so doing his future utility is suﬃciently adversely aﬀected. The problem hinges on the
distinction between on- and oﬀ-equilibrium path behaviour. It is possible to convince a
long-lived opponent that on the equilibrium path the commitment action will continue to
be played with high probability. But it is not possible for player one to signal what would
be done oﬀ the equilibrium path. Thus an equilibrium may speciﬁy that the opponent
does not play a best response to the commitment action in every period which is sustained
by the possibility that player one may severely punish her opponent in the future should
he ever deviate. Only if the opponent is short-lived and does not care about the future is
such an equilibrium behaviour impossible.
Nevertheless, the above argument furnishes a lower bound on Nash equilibrium pay-
oﬀs, though one which is generally lower than what could be attained if public commit-
ment to the commitment action were possible. Suppose again that player one adopts the
mimicking strategy. Once her opponent is convinced that the commitment action will
3be pursued in the future with very high probability, then he certainly must be playing
a response which gives him at least his minmax payoﬀ against the commitment action.
Because her opponent is not necessarily playing a best response as in the short-lived case,
the average payoﬀ received by player one can be lower than the commitment payoﬀ.1
To ﬁnd a lower bound we have to consider that individually rational response by player
two which gives player one the lowest payoﬀ. Since it is always an option to mimic the
commitment type, the payoﬀ just described must be a lower bound on player one’s payoﬀ
in any Nash equilibrium provided that she is patient enough to wait for the learning to
take place. More precisely, we show that for any prior probability of the commitment
t y p e ,a n df o ra n yg i v e nd i s c o u n tf a c t o ro fp l a y e rt w o ,t h eﬁrst player’s equilibrium payoﬀs
are bounded below by an amount converging to this lower bound as player one’s discount
f a c t o rc o n v e r g e st ou n i t y .T h i sr e s u l ti sv e r y robust: it is independent of the existence of
types of player one other than the commitment type, and is also robust to the existence
of small amounts of incomplete information about player two.
The same lower bound has been established for the case where both players evaluate
payoﬀsa c c o r d i n gt ol o n gr u na v e r a g e sb yC r i p p sa n dT h o m a s( 1 9 9 2 ) ,u s i n gm e t h o d s
based on Hart’s (1985) characterization of Nash equilibria of repeated games with one-
sided incomplete information. In comparison very little is known about the discounted
case and the case where both players are incompletely informed. The method we use
here relies upon the martingale convergence arguments ﬁrst established by Fudenberg
and Levine (1992), in contrast to the standard martingale techniques used in the zero
discounted case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is described.
Section 3 establishes some preliminary results on Bayesian learning in a Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4 we derive the lower bound described above and discuss its robustness. There
we also consider the case of two-sided uncertainty, and we discuss the role of the relative
patience of the two players. Section 5 gives a few examples to illustrate our results.
Finally, in Section 6 we ask whether our bound can be improved. First we show that
if the commitment type plays the commitment action on and oﬀ the equilibrium path,
and if this type has a non-negligible probability, then a higher bound can be established.
1Only in games of conﬂicting interests must he play a best response.
4However, this higher bound converges to the original bound as the perturbation becomes
small, i.e., as the probability of the commitment type goes to 0. Second, we allow for more
complicated commitment strategies, namely any pure strategy that can be implemented
by a ﬁnite automaton. We show that the existence of types playing such strategies does
not improve our bound. Section 7 concludes and outlines directions for future research.
2. The Model
The description of the model follows closely Fudenberg and Levine (1989,1992) and
Schmidt (1993a). There are two players called “one” (she) and “two” (he). In every
period each player selects an “action” ai out of a ﬁnite action space Ai, i ∈ {1,2}.T h e
stage game g may have an arbitrary extensive form, so an action should be thought of as
a contingent plan of moves for the stage game. A mixed action is denoted by αi ∈ Ai.
The payoﬀ function of player i in the stage game is given by gi(a1,a 2), and, in an abuse
of notation, gi(α1,α2) denotes the expected payoﬀ if the mixed action proﬁle (α1,α2)i s
being played.
The T-fold repetition of g is denoted by GT,w h e r eT may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite.
Our results are stated for the inﬁnite horizon case, but all of them carry over to ﬁnitely
repeated games if T is large enough. The overall payoﬀ for player i in the repeated game













where δi,0≤ δi < 1, denotes the respective discount factor. We follow the convention to
normalize payoﬀs so that stage game and repeated game payoﬀsc a nb ee x p r e s s e do nt h e
same scale. The normalized or average payoﬀ is
vi(δi)=( 1 − δi)V
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The reference to δi will be omitted if there is no ambiguity.
Throughout the paper we restrict attentiont ot h ec a s ew h e r eb o t hp l a y e r so b s e r v e
the realized action proﬁle (at
1,a t
2) after each period. Of course, if a mixed action has
been played, only the outcome of the randomization process can be observed. It would
5be possible to extend the analysis to the more general case where players observe a signal
about each others’ strategies after each period. In our case this signal is just the realized
action proﬁle. But the more general formulation also includes games of moral hazard,
where the observed signal contains only statistical information about the actions that
have been taken. Furthermore, even if the signal is deterministic, it need not reveal how
a player would have played at an unreached information set of the stage game.2 This
more general case has been dealt with by Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and we refer
the reader to their work for more details. At the expense of a considerable increase of
notation we could have stated all our results in this more general formulation, but since
the generalization follows exactly the lines of Fudenberg and Levine we chose not to do
so.
Now consider a perturbation of this game such that there is some incomplete infor-
mation about the payoﬀ function of player i, i ∈ {1,2}.I n p e r i o d 0 t h e “ t y p e ” ωi of
player i is drawn by nature out of the countable set Ωi =( ω0
i,ω1
i,...) according to the
probability measure µi.L e tω0
i denote the “normal” type of player i whose payoﬀ function
is as described in the unperturbed game, i.e.
gi(a1,a 2 | ω
0
i)=gi(a1,a 2). (3)
We will omit the reference to ω0
i in the payoﬀ functions of the normal type of each
player. The other types will sometimes be called “irrational types”. They may have
arbitrary payoﬀ functions gi(at
1,a t
2,ωi,t) which may be non-stationary. We also allow for
the possibility that some of them are not expected utility maximizers but automata that
follow arbitrary strategies.
Let Ht =( A1 ×A2)t be the set of all possible histories ht up to and including period
t. A pure strategy si ∈ Si for player i in the perturbed repeated game is a sequence of
maps st
i : Ωi × Ht−1 → Ai. Correspondingly, σi =( σ1
i,σ2
i,···) ∈ Σi denotes a mixed
(behavioral) strategy of player i.
We are particularly interested in what impact the presence of “commitment types”
has on the set of equilibrium outcomes. A commitment type is an irrational type who
2For example, if a buyer chooses not to buy, then she does not learn what quality the seller would
have provided had she bought.
6wants to play the same (possibly mixed) action ˆ αi in every period.3 Such a type is denoted
by ω(ˆ αi).
Finally we introduce some deﬁnitions which will be used frequently. Let




gi(a1,a 2)( 4 )
be the worst payoﬀ player i, normal type, can get in the stage game,




gi(a1,a 2)( 5 )
be the best payoﬀ for player i,a n d




gi(a1,a 2)( 6 )
be her minmax payoﬀ.
3. Bayesian Inference and Equilibrium Payoﬀs
For notational simplicity we consider only the case of one-sided uncertainty in this section,
i.e., player two is the normal type with probability 1. The following results are statements
on how player two predicts future play and hold for any type of player two. Two-sided
incomplete information is reintroduced in Section 4.
Suppose there is a type ˆ ω1 = ω1(ˆ α1) who is committed to always play the (possibly
mixed) action ˆ α1.4 We want to show that if player one chooses to follow this strategy
(which happens with a probability of at least µ1(ˆ ω1) > 0 in any Nash equilibrium), then
player two cannot continue to respond with a strategy which gives him less than his
3Note, that a commitment type who strictly prefers to play the same mixed action in every period
cannot be an expected utility maximizer. Fudenberg und Levine (1992) have chosen a diﬀerent way to
formalize the idea that a player may be able to maintain a reputation for always playing a mixed action.
They assume a continuum of types with non-stationary preferences. Each type prefers a particular
sequence of actions over all others. A type that is committed to a mixed strategy can be generated
through integration over a subset of such types. We refer the reader to Fudenberg and Levine (1992,
p. 566) for technical details. Their formulation has the advantage that all types are expected utility
maximizers, but it is considerably more complicated. The way in which a mixed strategy commitment
type is modelled does not aﬀect the results.
4Type ˆ ω1 may be an automaton that always plays ˆ α1,o ri tm a yb eat y p ew i t hap a y o ﬀ function such
that it is a dominant strategy in the repeated game to always play ˆ α1. The crucial point is that ˆ ω1 plays
ˆ α1 on the equilibrium path of any Nash equilbrium.
7minmax payoﬀ against ˆ α1.T h i si nt u r ni m p l i e sal o w e rb o u n df o rt h ee q u i l i b r i u mp a y o ﬀ
of the normal type of player one which will be characterized in more detail in Section 4.
In this section we establish two preliminary results. First, in Proposition 1, we show
that if player two’s equilibrium strategy gives him less than minmaxg2 when he plays
against ˆ ω1, then he must expect that the probability distribution over outcomes generated
by the repeated play of ˆ α1 diﬀers from the one generated by the “expected” equilibrium
strategy of player one, where the expectation is taken over all possible types weighted
with the probability measure µ1(ω1). Furthermore, because player two discounts future
payoﬀs, there must be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these distributions in the not too
distant future. The second result (Proposition 2) uses a theorem by Fudenberg and Levine
(1992) to establish that if player one sticks to always playing ˆ α1,t h e np l a y e rt w oc a n n o t
continue to believe that the true probability distribution over outcomes is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the one generated by ˆ α1. Taken together, these results imply that if player
one always plays according to ˆ α1, then player two cannot continue to respond with a
strategy which gives him less than minmaxg2. Eventually, he will learn that his opponent
plays ˆ α1, and he will choose a response which gives him at least his minmax payoﬀ.
In Proposition 1 we heavily exploit the fact that player two can guarantee himself
at least his minmax payoﬀ in every Nash equilibrium. The problem is, however, that the
minmax payoﬀ is a lower bound not for the actual but only for the expected equilibrium
payoﬀ. Thus, player two could continue to play a strategy which gives him less than
his minmax payoﬀ against ˆ α1 if he believes that there is a high enough probability that
player one will eventually play according to some other strategy. To be more precise: It
may be that the equilibrium strategy of player two yields strictly less than minmaxg2
against type ˆ ω1, as long as it yields at least minmaxg2 in expectation against all types of
player one, where the expectation is taken according to the beliefs of player two. However,
the following proposition says that in this case the strategy of type ˆ ω1 and the expected
strategy of player one must lead to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent probability distributions over
outcomes in the not too distant future.
The intuition for this result is simple: Given that player two discounts future payoﬀs,
everything that happens after some ﬁnite period N is insigniﬁcant for today’s expected
payoﬀ. Suppose the probability distributions over nodes in the game tree up to period N
8generated by the equilibrium strategy of player two, paired with ﬁrst the repeated play
of ˆ α1 and secondly with the expected equilibrium strategy of player one, are arbitrarily
close to each other. Then the distribution over payoﬀs for player two would be almost
the same in both cases. Thus, if he gets strictly less than minmaxg2 against ˆ ω1,h em u s t
also get less than minmaxg2 against the expected equilibrium strategy of player one, a
contradiction.
To express this formally consider after any history ht the set of possible outcomes
















i is the action played at period τ by player i. For given equilibrium strategies
(σ1,σ2)w el e tpN(·|ht) be the distribution over these outcomes and likewise pN(·|ht, ˆ ω1)
the distribution conditional additionally upon player one’s true type being ˆ ω1 (deﬁned
for ht having positive probability under the type conditioning). We deﬁne for any two
distributions pN and ˆ pN,
k p
N − ˆ p
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Proposition 1 Let ˆ α1 be any (mixed) action and suppose that there is a type
ˆ ω1 with µ1(ˆ ω1) > 0 for whom it is a dominant strategy in the repeated game
always to play ˆ α1.L e t δ2 < 1 and ²>0 be given and consider any Nash
equilibrium and any history ht which has positive probability in this equilibrium
conditional upon ˆ ω1. Suppose that conditional upon player one being ˆ ω1 the








≤ minmaxg2 − ². (10)
9Then there exists a ﬁnite integer N a n dan u m b e rη > 0, both depending only




N(·|ht, ˆ ω1) k > η . (11)
Proof: To simplify notation let pN = pN(·|ht)a n dˆ pN = pN(·|ht, ˆ ω1). Choose N to be










Next, deﬁne ˜ V
t+1
2 (yN) to be the payoﬀ to the normal type of player two over the next N






















yN pN ˜ V
t+1
2 (yN), and
since this is a continuous function of pN there exists an η > 0 such that k pN − ˆ pN k ≤ η
implies that
¯ ¯ ¯EpN[˜ V
t+1
2 (yN)] − Eˆ pN[˜ V
t+1
2 (yN)]
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ²
2(1−δ2). Hence assume to the contrary
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10which is impossible. Q.E.D.
The next result shows that if player one always plays ˆ α1, then there can be only a
ﬁnite number of periods in which the probability distribution over outcomes predicted
by player two diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the true distribution. Eventually, player two will
predict future play (almost) correctly.
Given integers N and n,w i t hN>0a n d0≤ n<N ,d e ﬁne the set T(n,N)=
{n,n+N,n+2N,...}. Suppose that at the end of each of the periods t ∈ T(n,N)p l a y e r
two makes predictions about the course of play over the following N periods. The Lemma
says that if ˆ ω1 is the true type of player one then, no matter how small µ1(ˆ ω1)a n dw h a t
strategies the other types of player one are supposed to play, in almost all periods player
two will make predictions which are very close to the true predictions given player one’s
type. The proposition is a straightforward adaptation of the main theorem of Fudenberg
and Levine (1992) which is stated for the case N =1 .
Proposition 2 (Fudenberg and Levine) Given integers N and n,w i t hN>
0 and 0 ≤ n<N, and for every ξ > 0, ∆ > 0 and a type of player one ˆ ω1 with
µ1(ˆ ω1) > 0,t h e r ei saK depending only on N, ξ, ∆,a n dµ1(ˆ ω1) such that for
any (σ1,σ2), the probability, conditional on player one’s true type being ˆ ω1,





t, ˆ ω1) k > ∆ (18)
is less than ξ.
Proof: See Fudenberg and Levine (1992), Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 2 is closely related to Kalai and Lehrer’s (1991) result that players will
learn to play a Nash equilibrium if their priors about the other player’s strategy contain
a “grain of truth”. In our model the grain of truth is that player two believes that, with
probability µ1(ˆ ω1) > 0, player one is a type who always plays ˆ α1.I fˆ α1 is played in every
period, player two will eventually learn to predict future play correctly.
114. The Lower Bound on Equilibrium Payoﬀs
Consider a history of any Nash equilibrium in which player one plays ˆ α1 in every period.
By Proposition 1 we know that, on the one hand, player two can reply with a strategy
which yields less than minmaxg2 against ˆ α1 only if he believes that the probability dis-
tribution over outcomes generated by player one’s expected equilibrium strategy diﬀers
signiﬁcantly from the one generated by ˆ α1 over the next N periods. On the other hand,
by Proposition 2 we know that there are at most K periods in which player two may
believe that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence if the true distribution is the one generated by
ˆ α1. Thus, there can be at most K · N periods, K · N<∞, in which player two chooses
not to play a strategy which gives him less than minmaxg2 against ˆ α1.5
¿From the perspective of player one, normal type, this implies that if she sticks to
always playing ˆ α1, then player two must eventually restrict himself to choose strategies
which yield at least minmaxg2 against ˆ α1. To put this more formally, let ˆ α1 ∈ A1 be a
given stage game action for player one and consider the set
M(ˆ α1)={α2 ∈ A2 | g2(ˆ α1,α2) ≥ minmaxg2} , (19)
i.e., the set of all mixed actions of player two which give him at least his minmax payoﬀ
against ˆ α1.W en o wd e ﬁne player one’s minimal commitment payoﬀ of ˆ α1 as
g
∗
1(ˆ α1)= m i n
α2∈M(ˆ α1)
g1(ˆ α1,α2) . (20)
Furthermore, let the worst payoﬀ to player one if she plays ˆ α1 and player two minimizes
against it be denoted by
g1(ˆ α1)= m i n
α2∈A2
g1(ˆ α1,α2) . (21)
Theorem 1 Let ˆ ω1 be a commitment type who always plays ˆ α1,a n dl e tµ1(ω0
1) >
0 and µ1(ˆ ω1) > 0 be given. Then, given δ2 < 1 and for any φ > 0,t h e r ee x i s t s
5The formal argument is a bit more involved. Since ˆ α1 may be mixed we can only say that there will
be more than K ·N such periods with probability less than ξ. Furthermore, the argument is complicated
by the possibility that players one and two may have diﬀerent discount factors. See the proof of Theorem
1.
12a δ1 < 1 such that whenever δ1 < δ1 < 1 the expected payoﬀ of the normal









1(ˆ α1) − φ . (22)
Proof: The basic idea is to show that if the normal type of player one mimics the com-
mitment strategy ˆ α1, then she will get close to g∗
1(ˆ α1), and hence her equilibrium payoﬀ
must be at least this amount. To simplify notation let ˆ g∗
1 = g∗
1(ˆ α1)a n dˆ g1 = g1(ˆ α1).
Fix φ > 0. By the deﬁnition of the minimal commitment payoﬀ,i fg2(ˆ α1,α2) ≥
minmaxg2,t h e ng1(ˆ α1,α2) ≥ ˆ g∗
1.W ec a nc h o o s e²>0 such that






Given ² there is an N and an η as in Proposition 1 such that (??) holds whenever (??)





By Proposition 2 there is a ﬁnite K such that the probability that inequality (??)h o l d s
more than K times in T(n,N)i sl e s st h a nξ, so the probability that inequality (??)h o l d s
more than K times in T(n,N)m u s ta l s ob el e s st h a nξ. Hence, considering all values




2 | ht, ˆ ω1
i
≤
minmaxg2−²” occur more than NK times given ˆ ω1 is smaller than Nξ.[ I no t h e rw o r d s ,
if player one follows the commitment strategy, the continuation payoﬀ of player two,
computed under the assumption that player one is following the commitment strategy, is
unlikely to be much below the minmax payoﬀ more than a certain number of times.]
Next, let ˆ α1(a1) be the probability with which action a1 is played under ˆ α1,a n dl e t
σ
t+1
2 (a2 | ht) be the random variable representing the probabilty with which player two






















i.e., in period τ after history hτ−1 player two’s expected payoﬀ is generated by player
one using ˆ α1 and player two using στ
2(hτ−1). Player two’s future expected payoﬀ E(v
t+1
2 |
ht, ˆ ω1) is therefore a convex combination of terms g2(ˆ α1,στ
2).
Consider the convex set of payoﬀs( g1,g 2) that are consistent with player one playing
ˆ α1 and denote this set by F(ˆ α1). Note that there cannot be a point in F(ˆ α1)w i t hg1 < ˆ g∗
13and g2 > minmaxg2,b e c a u s eˆ g∗
1 is deﬁned to be the smallest payoﬀ player one can get if
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1 (δ2)s i g n i ﬁes the discounted sum of player one’s payoﬀs, calculated using δ2 to
discount instead of δ1. [The left hand side of the inequality (??) is just the expected value
of g1(a1,a 2) using the probability distribution just referred to; i.e. it is the right hand
side of equation (??)w i t hg2 replaced by g1.] Consequently (??) can only fail more than
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Consequently the payoﬀ to the normal type of player one if she follows the commitment
strategy is6
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) − (δ1 − δ2)(ˆ g
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6Because (??) is a discounted sum, the partial sums which are always random variables converge
everywhere and hence the inﬁnite sum is measurable.
14with probability at least (1 − Nξ) conditional on ˆ ω1, where we are using the fact that
in the event that (??) fails no more than NK times, substracting (ˆ g∗
1 − ˆ g1) NK times
undiscounted yields a payoﬀ lower than the minimum possible. The random variable is
at least δ1−δ2
1−δ1 ˆ g1 otherwise.
Using this in (??) and taking the limit as δ1 → 1 yields
lim








+ Nξˆ g1 ;( 3 1 )
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Choosing δ1 such that the left hand side of (??)i sw i t h i n
φ
3 of its limit, we have for δ1 ≥ δ1
E [v1 | ˆ ω1] ≥ ˆ g
∗
1 − φ . (33)
Consequently, by mimicking type ˆ ω1, player one is guaranteed a payoﬀ of ˆ g∗
1 − φ.T h e
result follows. Q.E.D.
Let us now come back to the case of two-sided uncertainty. Propositions 1 and 2
are statements on how player two predicts future play and are independent of player
two’s actual type. If there are several types of player two, then player two will make his
predictions conditional on his true type. Except for this the statements of the propositions
are the same.
However, the lower bound for player one’s equilibrium payoﬀ is aﬀected by the pos-
sibility of other types. By Theorem 1 we know that if player one faces the normal type
of player two, then she will get at least g∗
1(ˆ α1) − φ in any Nash equilibrium. This hap-
pens with probability µ2(ω0
2). If she plays against some other type, which happens with
probability 1 − µ2(ω0
2), the worst that can happen to her if she sticks to ˆ α1 is that she
15gets g1(ˆ α1) in every period. Thus, we can give the following lower bound for her expected
payoﬀ:7
Corollary 1 Let µi(ω0
i) > 0, i ∈ {1,2},a n dµ1(ˆ ω1) > 0 be given. Then, given
δ2 < 1,a n df o ra n yφ > 0 there exists a δ1 < 1 such that whenever δ1 < δ1 < 1


















1(ˆ α1) − φ) . (34)
Up to this point we have taken the strategy ˆ α1 which could be mimicked by the normal
type of player one as given. Let us now ask: What is the strategy which maximizes the
lower bound of player one’s equilibrium payoﬀ? We will pose this question for “small”
perturbations of the informational structure, i.e. with probability 1−² each player believes
that the other player is normal. But there is a small probability ²>0 that the opponent
has a diﬀerent payoﬀ function compared to the unperturbed game. Note that we do not
restrict the set of possible types. For small perturbations of the informational structure
the following theorem gives the best lower bound for player one’s equilibrium payoﬀ.
Theorem 2 For any given δ2 < 1 and ψ > 0 there exists an ²>0,s u c h
that for all ²-perturbations of G that satisfy µi(ω0
i) ≥ 1 − ² and µ1(ω∗
1) > 0
the following holds: There exists a δ1 < 1, such that if δ1 < δ1 < 1,t h e nt h e
expected payoﬀ of the normal type of player one in any Nash equilibrium of

















g1(α1,α2)( 3 6 )
is the best lower bound from mimicking a commitment type ω∗
1 who always
plays the same action in every period.
7We can also establish the following trivially: Suppose player two has two “normal types”. Then
compute the lower bound given each type of player two and take the weighted average according to their
prior probabilities. This average is the lower bound for player one’s expected equilibrium payoﬀ.T h e
argument extends to any ﬁnite number of types.
16Proof: Fix ψ > 0a n dl e tα∗


















1) and suppose that µ1(ω∗
1) > 0. By Corollary 1 we know that for any
δ2 < 1a n dφ > 0 there exists a δ1 < 1s u c ht h a ti fδ1 < δ1 < 1p l a y e ro n e ,n o r m a lt y p e ,





















1) − φ) . (38)
Suppose that g1(α∗
1) <g ∗












+( 1− ²)φ . (39)
Using µ2(ω0






































1 − ψ .
Q.E.D.
This lower bound on equilibrium payoﬀs has several important properties:
- It holds for all Nash equilibria, no matter whether they are in pure or in mixed
strategies, whether they are perfect Bayesian or whether they satisfy any other
reﬁnement. Even more generally, it holds for all self-conﬁrming equilibria. A self-
conﬁrming equilibrium is a weaker notion than Nash equilibrium because it does not
require that a player correctly predicts the other player’s play oﬀ the equilibrium
path. However, in our context the set of self-conﬁrming equilibrium outcomes and
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides,8 so we can stick to the more familiar
Nash concept.
8See Fudenberg and Levine (1993) for a deﬁnition and characterization of self-conﬁrming equilibria.
17- The results do not depend on the assumption that the game is inﬁnitely repeated.
All our arguments go through for a ﬁnite horizon if there are enough repetitions.
-T h e l o w e r b o u n d o ﬀered above is independent of what other types of player one and
two may exist with positive probability. The earlier literature on repeated games
with incomplete information assumed that there is only one “crazy” type that may
have positive probability. We ﬁnd it implausible to a priori restrict the set of possible
types. Our approach rather follows Fudenberg and Levine (1989) in allowing for
arbitrarily many diﬀerent types with arbitrary payoﬀ functions. Thus, our result
does not hinge delicately on the speciﬁc informational assumptions imposed by the
modeler but is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure.
It is important to note that in Theorems 1 and 2 the discount factor of player two
is ﬁxed while δ1 has to be chosen close enough to 1. Put diﬀerently, player one has to
be patient enough as compared to player two. To see why this is the case suppose the
discount factor of player two increases. Since he is more patient, he cares more about
future payoﬀs. Thus, he may continue for a longer period of time to play a strategy
which gives him less than minmaxg2 against type ˆ ω1, even if he expects an equilibrium
strategy of player one which is very close to always playing ˆ α1. That is, the number N
in Proposition 1 increases. Thus, if player one wants to mimic ˆ ω1,s h eh a st ow a i tf o ra
longer period until she can be sure that player two will respond with a strategy which
gives player two at least minmaxg2. To get the same lower bound for player one’s average
equilibrium payoﬀ she has to be suﬃciently more patient.
In Theorem 1 we do not give an explicit formula for δ1 as a function of δ2,s ow e
cannot use this result to characterize how much more patient player one has to be than
player two in order to obtain the lower bound. However, in an earlier draft of this paper
we considered the special case where ˆ α1 is restricted to be a pure strategy. In this case






i.e., in the limit as player two’s discount factor approaches 1, player one is inﬁnitely more
p a t i e n tt h a np l a y e rt w o .
18In economic applications it is typically diﬃcult to justify why two players face diﬀer-
ent discount rates. This is why we would like to oﬀer a diﬀerent interpretation:9 Suppose
player one is a “big” player who plays the same game against L “small” opponents, de-
noted by 21,...,2L. Each of the small players 2j is long-lived and has the same discount
factor as the “big” player one. Divide each period in L subperiods and suppose that
player one plays sequentially against the small player 2j in subperiod j, j =1 ,...,L.
Suppose that each of the small players can observe the play not only in his own game but
also in all other games player one is playing against the other players 2k, k 6= j.I ti se a s y
to see that increasing the number of small players is equivalent to increasing the discount
factor of player one.10 Thus, we can say that player one can exploit reputation eﬀects to
increase his equilibrium payoﬀ if he is suﬃciently big as compared to his opponents.
How useful is our lower bound? If we are interested in games where the informa-
tional structure is only slightly perturbed, i.e., games where µi(ω0
i) is close to 1, then the
lower bound oﬀered in (??) is in general higher than player one’s minmax payoﬀ because
minmaxg2 is derived from minimizing player one’s payoﬀ over all α2 ∈ A2,w h i l eg∗
1 is
obtained from minimizing over the smaller set M(α∗
1), i.e. the set of all strategies which
give player two at least his minmax payoﬀ. Thus, our lower bound can be used to restrict
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes as compared to the prediction of the Folk theorem.
This will be illustrated with some examples in Section 5.
The second question that arises is whetherp l a y e ro n ec a ng u a r a n t e eh i m s e l fm o r e
than the lower bound given in (??) by mimicking any other type who does not follow a
constant but a more complicated, possibly history dependent strategy. In section 6 we
will show that if we are looking for a lower bound for all Nash equilibria and if we do
not impose any restriction on what other types may have positive probabilities, then the
lower bound derived in (??)i si n d e e dt h eb e s tw ec a ng e te v e ni fal a r g ec l a s so fo t h e r
commitment types using arbitrarily complex history dependent strategies are considered.
9We are grateful to Nabil Al Najjar for suggesting this interpretation.
10The argument still works (but is slightly more complicated) if player one plays against all L opponents
at the same time.
195. Examples
We now consider some examples to illustrate the power and the limitations of our results
and to relate them to the literature. Let us start with the well known “Battle of the








































Figure 1 − T h eB a t t l eo ft h eS e x e s
Player one’s minmax strategy is to play U with probability 3
4 and D with probability 1
4
w h i c hh o l d sp l a y e rt w od o w nt oap a y o ﬀ of 3
4. Thus, player two must get at least that
much in expected terms in any Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the Folk theorem predicts
that any feasible payoﬀ vector that gives each player at least 3
4 can be sustained as an
equilibrium outcome.
Now suppose that the informational structure is perturbed such that with positive
probability there exists a type of player one for whom it is a dominant strategy to always
play T. In order to get at least his minmax payoﬀ against this type, player two must play
L at least with probability 3
4. Thus, if player one mimics this type and if she is patient
enough as compared to player two, then she will get at least a payoﬀ of 9
4 in any Nash
equilibrium of the repeated game. This considerably reduces the set of Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs as compared to the prediction of the Folk theorem.11
The Battle of the Sexes game is completely symmetric. Thus, if there is a type of
player two who always plays R, then, if player two is patient enough as compared to
11For a more detailed discussion of the Folk theorem, and in which sense our lower bound is in contrast
to its prediction, see Schmidt (1993a, ??f).
20player one, he can also guarantee himself at least 9






is not in the feasible set. That is, it is impossible that in equilibrium both players
build up a reputation for always playing their most preferred commitment strategy. This
s h o w s ,t h a tt h eo u t c o m em u s td e p e n do nt h er e l a t i v ep a t i e n c eo ft h et w op l a y e r s .I fp l a y e r
one is suﬃciently more patient than player two, or, if she has suﬃciently more at stake
(e.g. because she plays against many player twos simultaneously), then she can use the
reputation eﬀect to her advantage and vice versa.
However, even if player one is arbitrarily more patient than player two, i.e. if 1−δ1
1−δ2
is arbitrarily close to 0, we are not back to the case of Fudenberg and Levine where a
long-run player faces a sequence of short-lived opponents. In the example of the Battle of
the Sexes Fudenberg and Levine’s result implies that if player one sticks to always playing
U, then her short-lived opponents will eventually play a best response, i.e. they will play
L with probability 1. This gives player one her Stackelberg payoﬀ of 3. In contrast, if
player two is long-lived it is not true that player two has to play a best response against
U even if he believes that U is certain to played in every period along the equilibrium
path. As discussed in the introduction, the reason is that player two may be afraid that
he will be punished oﬀ the equilibrium path if he deviates now and plays a best response
against U. This is why we can establish only a smaller lower bound, 9
4, which is derived
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a te v e ni fp l a y e rt w od o e sn o tp l a yab e s tr e s p o n s eh em u s tg e ta tl e a s t
his minmax payoﬀ.
Our lower bound is most powerful if the game is of “conﬂicting interests” in the sense
of Schmidt (1993a), i.e., if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit
herself holds the other player down to his minmax payoﬀ.I nt h i sc a s ep l a y e rt w om u s t
eventually play a best response against player one’s commitment strategy in order to get
at least minmaxg2. This is why for games of conﬂicting interests we get the same lower
bound as Fudenberg and Levine. Examples of such games include the Chain-Store game
and the Game of Chicken. We generalize Schmidt’s results in two respects. First of all,
our theory, which contains his results as a special case, applies to all games, not only to
games of conﬂicting interests.12 Secondly, Schmidt (1993a) considered only pure strategy
12Schmidt (1993a, p.20) suggests a diﬀerent and much weaker generalization of his results. Suppose
that the game is not of conﬂicting interests but that there is a type of player one who is comitted to hold
player two down to his minmax payoﬀ. Eventually player two must play a best response against this
21commitment types while we also allow for mixed strategies.
T h en e x te x a m p l es h o w st h a ti tm a yb ew o r t h w h i l ef o rap l a y e rt om i m i cam i x e d
strategy. Consider the stage game depicted in Figure 2. Suppose player one mimics a
type who plays U in every period. Eventually player two must respond R with probability




























Figure 2 − Commitment to a Mixed Strategy.
However, player one can guarantee herself more if she can mimic mixed strategy
types. Suppose there is a type who plays U with probability 1
2 +² and D with probability
1
2 − ² in every period. Again, in order to get at least his minmax payoﬀ player two must
respond to this strategy by playing R with probability 1. But this gives player one an
expected payoﬀ of 3
2 − ².
Let us ﬁnally give an example where our lower bound is of no use. Consider the
Prisoners’ Dilemma game of Figure 3. No matter which strategy is mimicked by player
one, player two can always guarantee himself his minmax payoﬀ by playing D,s op l a y e r
one cannot guarantee herself more than 1, which is his minmax payoﬀ.T h u s ,o u rl o w e r
bound does not restrict the set of Nash equilibrium payoﬀsa sc o m p a r e dt ot h ep r e d i c t i o n
of the Folk theorem.
strategy. Thus, mimicking this commitment type guarantees player one a payoﬀ which is lower than his
Stackelberg payoﬀ but which may still be higher than his minmax payoﬀ.N o t et h a tw ea l l o wf o rt h i sk i n d
of commitment types as well, so our best lower bound must be at least as high as the one of Schmidt.
Note further, that in many games Schmidt’s lower bound is of no use because it is strictly lower than the
minmax payoﬀ. For example, in the Battle of the Sexes game Schmidt’s commitment type would play U
with probability 3
4 and D with probability 1
4. The best response of player two which is worst for player
o n ei st oa l w a y sp l a yR which gives player one a payoﬀ of 1
4 (less than her minmax payoﬀ), so the lower


































Figure 3 − The Prisoner’s Dilemma.
This is in interesting contrast to the approach of Watson (1993) who shows that if
the inﬁnitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is perturbed only with strategies of bounded
recall, including the “tit-for-tat” strategy, then the payoﬀs associated with the set of pure
strategy equilibria is close to the cooperative, eﬃcient payoﬀ vector. Aumann and Sorin
(1989) have a similar result for common interest games. The diﬀerence between Watson’s
approach and ours is not that his allows for the possibility of mimicking a “tit-for-tat” type
(i.e. a type that uses a history dependent commitment strategy) and our approach does
not. We will consider such kind of commitment strategies in the next section and show
that they do not improve our lower bound. The crucial diﬀerence is that Watson restricts
attention to pure strategy equilibria, while we consider the set of all Nash equilibria.
6. Improvements of the Lower Bound
In this section we ask whether it is possible to improve the lower bound derived in Section
4. First we show that the lower bound can be improved if we consider perturbations of
the informational structure in which a particular commitment type has a non-negligible
probability (Proposition 3). Then we come back to small perturbations of the informa-
tional structure and consider the possibility that player one may mimic not a constant
strategy but a more complicated history dependent strategy. In Theorem 3 we show that
the lower bound of Section 4 is tight even if we allow for commitment types playing arbi-
trarily complicated history dependent strategies, more precisely, any pure strategy which
23can be implemented by a ﬁnite automaton.
6.1. Commitment Types with Non-negligible Probabilities
Theorems 1 and 2 are based on considerations relating to behaviour on the equilibrium
path: Provided the commitment strategy is followed on the equilibrium path by some
type of player 1, then the bound follows, and it does not matter what such a player
might do should player two not adhere to his equilibrium strategy. In general though,
oﬀ equilibrium path considerations lead to a tighter bound if there is a type following
ˆ α1 whatever happens. Intuitively, the punish m e n tt h a tc a nb ei m p o s e do np l a y e rt w oi s
less severe since with a certain probability player one will play ˆ α1 rather than a minmax
strategy. This implies that once player two becomes convinced that ˆ α1 will be played on
the equilibrium path in the future, his continuation payoﬀ must be generally greater than
the minmax payoﬀ. This rules out certain long-run responses to ˆ α1 and hence raises the
payoﬀ from playing ˆ α1.
We consider the case where the commitment strategy is a pure strategy ˆ a1.L e tˆ ω1
be a type for whom it is a dominant strategy to always play this action in the repeated
game and let ˆ µ1 ≡ µ1(ˆ ω1). We deﬁne player two’s best response payoﬀ as
g2(ˆ a1)=m a x
a2∈A2
g2(ˆ a1,a 2) . (42)
Next deﬁne
˜ B (ˆ a1,δ2, ˆ µ1)= ( 4 3 )
n
α2 ∈ A2 | g2(ˆ a1,α2) ≥ ˆ µ1g2(ˆ a1)+( 1− ˆ µ1)
³
(1 − δ2)g
2 + δ2 minmaxg2
´o
and
˜ g1 (ˆ a1,δ2, ˆ µ1)= m i n
α2∈ ˜ B(ˆ a1,δ2,ˆ µ1)
g1(ˆ a1,α2) . (44)
Note that ˜ g1(ˆ a1,δ2, ˆ µ1) ≥ g∗
1(ˆ a1)b e c a u s et h em i n i m u mi st a k e no v e ras m a l l e rs e t .
Proposition 3 Let µi(ω0
i) > 0, i ∈ {1,2} and ˆ µ1 ≡ µ1(ˆ ω1) > 0 be given,
where ˆ ω1 is a type playing ˆ a1 after any history. Then, given δ2 < 1 and for
any φ > 0, there exists a δ1 < 1 such that whenever δ1 < δ1 < 1 the expected








2)(˜ g1 (ˆ a1,δ2, ˆ µ1) − φ) . (45)
24Proof: Consider, after any history ht which occurs with positive probability when player
one plays ˆ a1 every period, the least continuation payoﬀ that the normal type of player
two can receive in equilibrium. He always has the option of doing the following: play a
best response against ˆ a1 so long as ˆ a1 has been played in the past, and as soon as ˆ a1 is
not played, play a strategy which guarantees minmaxg2 thereafter. This strategy yields
player two a payoﬀ at least equal to
µ1(ˆ ω1)ˆ g2(ˆ a1)+( 1− µ1(ˆ ω1))
³
(1 − δ2)g
2 + δ2 minmaxg2
´
(46)
since the worst that can happen is that he is not facing type ˆ ω1 and player one does not
play ˆ a1 in period t and proceeds to minmax him thereafter, while against type ˆ ω1 his
payoﬀ is ˆ g2(ˆ a1); player two’s subjective beliefs after ht attach probability at least ˆ µ1 to
type ˆ ω1 since this probability cannot fall as long as ˆ a1 h a sb e e nf o l l o w e d .T h ep r o o f so f
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 can be repeated with (??) replacing minmaxg2,a n dt h e
result follows. Q.E.D.
For example in the Battle of the Sexes game with µ2(ω0
2)=1 ,δ2 close to 1, and
µ1(ˆ ω1)=1
2, we get a lower bound approaching 21
8 .A sµ1(ˆ ω1) approaches 1, the expres-
sion in (??) approaches ˆ g2(ˆ a1), the best response payoﬀ of player two, and consequently
˜ g1 (a1,δ2, ˆ µ1) approaches the Fudenberg-Levine commitment payoﬀ.
Note that Proposition 3 is useful only if one of the players assigns a considerable
probability to the event that his opponent is committed to one particular strategy. In
most applications, however, we are interested in small perturbations, where there may be
many diﬀerent types which have a very small prior probability. We will consider this case
in the rest of this section.
6.2. History Dependent Commitment Strategies
Up to now we focused on commitment types that played a constant action in every period.
The question arises whether player one can guarantee herself a higher lower bound than
g∗
1 (as deﬁned in Theorem 2) if she mimics a more complicated commitment type, i.e. a
type who follows a history dependent strategy. In this section we consider pure history
dependent strategies that can be implemented by a ﬁnite automaton, and we deﬁne g∗
1
now as the bound from mimicking the best pure strategy commitment type. We shall see
25that the answer to the above question is negative: commitment types cannot be improved
upon by such automata. In other words, if then o r m a lt y p eo fp l a y e ro n ec o u l dc h o o s ea
type (to be given positive prior probability by player two), then she could do no better
than choose a commitment type who plays the same action in every period. As a by-
product of this analysis the tightness of our bound will be established: there are Nash
equilibria arbitrarily close to the bound.
We start by deﬁning what we mean by a ﬁnite automaton. This is a machine (formally
a “Moore” machine) which has a ﬁnite number M of states represented by the set X,a n d
to each state x ∈ X is associated an action a1 ∈ A1, and there is a transition rule
which associates with each state and action of player two (x,a2) a new state for the
automaton. At period one the automaton starts in some initial state x0. The pure
strategy implemented by this automaton will be denoted ˆ s1.13
The following theorem shows that it is not possible to improve on g∗
1 by mimicking any
ﬁnite automaton who plays a strategy ˆ s1. That is, even if very complicated commitment
types exist, it is always possible to construct a Nash equilibrium in which player one,
normal type, gets at most g∗
1 + ²,w h e r e²>0 may be arbitrarily small.14
Theorem 3 Fix any pure strategy ˆ s1 that can be implemented by a ﬁnite
automaton. For any ²>0 there exists a perturbation of G in which ω(ˆ s1)
has strictly positive probability, there exists a δ with 0 < δ < 1, and for any
δ < δ1,δ2 < 1 there exists a Nash equilibrium of this perturbed game such




Note that Theorem 3 implies that our bound is tight: If we consider the automaton
13The automaton does not specify what action will be taken after histories in which the automaton has
not followed its own strategy. For Nash equilibria however this is not important and arbitrary actions
can be speciﬁed after such histories.
14We conjecture that this result extends to inﬁnite automata. However, we have been able to show this
only for the case of no discounting. To establish our result for history dependent mixed strategies would
be hopelessly complicated because we would have to construct a mixed strategy equilibrium for a game
with incomplete information.
26which always plays a∗
1, then the theorem tells us that there is an equilibrium of a perturbed
game in which ω1(a∗
1) has positive probability such that the equilibrium payoﬀ for player
one is arbitrarily close to g∗
1.
The proof of the theorem is complicated and relegated to the appendix. In the rest
of this section we try to give some intuition for it. We have to ﬁnd a perturbation of G in
which ω1(ˆ s1) has positive probability and a Nash equilibrium of this perturbed game in
which the normal type of player one gets less than g∗
1 +². Consider the most simple such
perturbation in which player one is either the normal type (with probability 1−µ)o rt h e
commitment type (with probability µ), while there is no uncertainty about the type of
player two. Depending on the strategy ˆ s1 we can construct at least one of two types of
Nash equilibria with the desired property:
- A pooling equilibrium: Suppose there exists a pure strategy ˆ s2 of player two such
that (ˆ s1, ˆ s2) yields a continuation payoﬀ (after any period t)s t r i c t l yh i g h e rt h a n
minmaxg2 to player two and strictly in between minmaxg1 and g∗
1 + ² to player
one. In this case the following strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium if both
players are patient enough: The normal and the commitment type of player one
both play ˆ s1 and player two responds with ˆ s2. Any deviation is minmaxed by the
other player. By construction, the normal type of player one gets less than g∗
1 + ²
in this equilibrium.
- A separating equilibrium: Suppose no such strategy for player two exists. In this
case any strategy ˆ s2 of player two will at some point either hold player one weakly
below her minmax payoﬀ, or give player two weakly less than his minmax payoﬀ
(or both). Consider a strategy ˆ s∗
2 which is a best response against ˆ s1.I fw ea r ei n
the former subcase we can construct an equilibrium as follows: Player one, normal
type, follows ˆ s1 up to the point where her expected continuation payoﬀ against ˆ s∗
2
no longer exceeds her minmax payoﬀ. At this point she reveals herself by deviating
from ˆ s1 and is rewarded in the continuation equilibrium with a payoﬀ strictly above
her minmax payoﬀ but strictly below g∗
1 +². Player two also gets strictly more than
minmaxg2 in this continuation equilibrium. He follows ˆ s∗
2 up to the period where
the normal type of player one is supposed to reveal herself. If he observes a deviation
from ˆ s1 at this point, he plays the above mentioned continuation equilibrium. If
27ˆ s1 w a sp l a y e di nt h i sp e r i o dh ec o n t i n u e sw i t hˆ s∗
2. Note that he is playing a best
response in this subgame. Oﬀ the equilibrium path deviations are minmaxed. Again,
it is easy to see that if players are suﬃciently patient these strategies constitute a
Nash equilibrium in which player one gets less than g∗
1 + ².
Finally, suppose that (ˆ s1, ˆ s∗
2) gives player two weakly less than her minmax payoﬀ.
In this case, because ˆ s∗
2 is a best response against ˆ s1,ˆ s∗
2 is simply any short-run best
response to the automaton’s action period by period since this guarantees player
two his minmax payoﬀ each period. But then, by the deﬁnition of g∗
1,( ˆ s1, ˆ s∗
2)c a n n o t
give player one more than g∗
1. Again, we can construct a separating equilibrium,
but now the normal type of player one is rewarded with g∗
1 +² if she reveals herself.
One technical twist in these arguments is that continuation payoﬀs after any period t
have to be bounded away from minmaxgi; otherwise the threat of mutual minmaxing
is not suﬃcient to deter a deviation. This is why we have to restrict attention to ﬁnite
automata.
7. Conclusions
If a player has the possibility to acquire a reputation for being a commitment type who
always takes the same action in every period, and if she is suﬃciently patient as compared
to her opponent, then this yields a lower bound for her payoﬀ in any Nash equilibrium.
This bound is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure. In
games that are not of “conﬂicting interests” our bound is weaker than the one derived by
Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 92) for games in which a long-lived player faces a sequence
of short-lived opponents. However, our bound is thight and still useful to reduce the set
of equilibrium payoﬀs predicted by the Folk theorem.
Our last theorem shows that it is not possible to ﬁnd a better lower bound for all Nash
equilibria. However, it is an important question of future research whether a better lower
bound can be obtained if the equilibrium notion is reﬁned and/or if the set of possible types
is restricted. Very few ﬁrst steps in this direction have been made. We mentioned the work
of Aumann and Sorin (1989) and Watson (1993) who restrict attention to pure strategy
28Nash equilibria. Cripps and Thomas (1993) consider the set of perfect equilibrium payoﬀs
in a perturbed common interest game. In this game perfection reduces the set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes, but very limitedly so. Unfortunately, even in this extremely simple
game the necessary computations turn out to be very complicated. Schmidt (1993b)
characterizes the set of all sequential equilibria satisfying a weak Markov property in a
ﬁnitely repeated bargaining game with incomplete information about the seller’s cost. He
exploits the special structure of the set of possible types to derive a sharp prediction of
the equilibrium payoﬀs for both players. Surprisingly, his results hold independent of the
relative patience of the two players. More work in this direction needs to be done.
29Appendix
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :We will use the following perturbation of G in which player one has
two possible types. With probability 1−µ she is the normal type, with probability µ she
is a ﬁnite automaton that follows the pure strategy ˆ s1. There is no uncertainty about the
type of player two.
The automaton that implements ˆ s1 has a ﬁnite number of states. There must exist at
least one subset of states which can be reached starting from x0 such that once reached,
the automaton must stay within this subset, and such that from each state within this set
any other state can be reached. Denote such a subset by Z. Notice that there must be




2) that will “steer” the automaton into a
state ˆ x ∈ Z at time ˆ t+1withinˆ t ≤ M −1 periods. Let ˆ h
ˆ t be the corresponding history:
ˆ h
ˆ t =( ( ˆ s1(h0),a 1
2),(ˆ s1(ˆ s1(h0),a 1
2),a 2
2),...); this will prove very useful below. If x0 ∈ Z then
ˆ t = 0 is possible, but it will be convenient if we deﬁne in this case ˆ t = 1 and choose some
arbitrary action for player two a2
1 so that ˆ h
ˆ t is not empty.
For our purposes the automaton can be characterized in terms of the set of long
run average payoﬀs which can be attained starting in a state x ∈ Z given that player
one is following the automaton strategy and that player two is following an arbitrary pure













(T − ˆ t)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
player one follows ˆ s1, player two follows any s2




Let V (δ1,δ2)={(v1(δ1),v 2(δ2))} for some 0 ≤ δ1,δ2 < 1.15 In order to avoid tedious
notation we assume that players can use correlated strategies. Thus, V is always convex.
The set of feasible payoﬀs in the stage game is a subset of V for all δ1, δ2.T h u s ,c l e a r l y
P ⊆ V .
Let g∗
1 be the highest bound from a pure strategy commitment type (as deﬁned in
Theorem 2 but where the maximum is taken over pure strategies only). Suppose that
some ²>0 is given. Our aim is to show that with the given automaton we can ﬁnd
critical values 1 > ¯ µ>0,0 < ¯ δ < 1 such that whenever 0 <µ<¯ µ and 1 > δ1,δ2 > ¯ δ,a n
equilibrium can be found which gives player one less than g∗
1 + ². Hence there will be a
positive value for µ such that, for ﬁxed δ2 > ¯ δ,n om a t t e rh o wp a t i e n tp l a y e ro n eb e c o m e s
relative to player two, our previous bound cannot be improved upon.
Without loss of generality we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1 For all 0 ≤ δ1, δ2 < 1 there exist (v1(δ1),v 2(δ2)) such that v1(δ1) >g ∗
1
and v2(δ2) > minmaxg2.
15Even though the set V always depends on δ1, δ2 the reference to discount factors will sometimes be
omitted if there is no ambiguity.
30Note that Assumption 1 implies that there exists a strictly individually rational payoﬀ
vector in the stage game. If this assumption is not satisﬁed for some (δ1,δ2)as i m p l e
argument shows that player one cannot get more than g∗
1 + ² in any Nash equilibrium:
Two cases have to be distinguished:
(i) For some 0 ≤ δ2 < 1 there does not exist a v2(δ2) > minmaxg2.I nt h i sc a s ep l a y e r
two has to play a best response to player one’s action in every period in order to
g e ta tl e a s tm i nm a xg2. But, by the deﬁnition of the lower bound, this cannot give
player one a payoﬀ higher than g∗
1.
(ii) For some 0 ≤ (δ1,δ2) < 1 there exists a (v1(δ1),v 2(δ2)) with v2(δ2) > minmaxg2,b u t
there does not exist a point (˜ v1(δ1), ˜ v2(δ2)) with ˜ v1(δ1) >g ∗
1 and ˜ v2δ2) > minmaxg2.
Denote the set of such (δ1,δ2)b y∆.N o t et h a tt h e r em u s te x i s tap o i n t( g1,g 2)i n
t h es e to ff e a s i b l es t a g eg a m ep a y o ﬀsw i t hg2 > minmaxg2.F i x s u c h a p o i n t .
Recall that (g1,g 2) ∈ V (δ1,δ2) for all 0 ≤ δ1,δ2 < 1, and that V (δ1,δ2)i sc o n v e x .
Consider the line L from (g1,g 2) through g∗
1,minmaxg2). Now suppose that for
some (δ1,δ2) ∈ ∆ there is a point (ˆ v1(δ1), ˆ v2(δ2)) such that ˆ v1(δ1) >g ∗
1 + ² and this
point lies strictly above line L. Then there must also exist a point
³
ˆ ˆ v1(δ1),ˆ ˆ v2(δ2)
´
with ˆ ˆ v1(δ1) >g ∗
1 and ˆ ˆ v2(δ2) > minmaxg2, a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that
for all (δ1,δ2) ∈ ∆ and for all (v1(δ1),v 2(δ2)) ∈ V (δ1,δ2), v1(δ1) >g ∗
1 + ² implies
v2(δ2) < minmaxg2 − α for some α > 0.
If player two faces the automaton type of player one, the best that can happen to
him is that he gets g2 in every period. Thus we have
v2(δ2) ≤ µg2 +( 1− µ)v2(δ2 | ω
0
1)
< η + v2(δ2 | ω
0
1)( 4 7 )
By choosing the perturbation to be small, we can make η = µg2 arbitrarily small.
Choose η = α. Thus, player one can get more than g∗
1 +² only if player two gets an
expected payoﬀ strictly smaller than his minmax payoﬀ, a contradiction.
The following lemma describes some properties of the limiting set P which we shall
need.
Lemma 1 (i) P is a convex set; (ii) For any η > 0, any initial state x ∈ Z,a n da n y
point (ˆ v1, ˆ v2) ∈ P, there exists ˜ δ < 1 such that for δ1, δ2 > ˜ δ there exists a strategy for
player two against the automaton, such that discounted continuation payoﬀsa r ea l w a y s
within η of (ˆ v1, ˆ v2); (iii) There is a point (˜ v1, ˜ v2) ∈ P with ˜ v1 ≤ g∗
1 and ˜ v2 ≥ minmaxg2.
Convexity follows straightforwardly from the ability to switch between states together
with zero discounting. The second property says that any point in P can be approximated
by a point in the discounted set as discounting goes to zero. The third property follows
31because player two can play a strategy against each action of player one which mimics
the response played in the deﬁnition of the lower bound.16
The concept of a best response against the automaton will also prove important
below. If on the equilibrium path at any stage of the game player two becomes convinced
that he faces the automaton type in state x, then his continuation strategy must be
a best response against the automaton strategy, and there always exists such a best
response which, after at most M − 1 periods, leads to an outcome path which cycles
with periodicity equal to some integer K where K ≤ M (this follows immediately from
dynamic programming). We refer in this case to ab e s tr e s p o n s es t a r t i n gf r o mx with cycle
K.
Depending upon the set P there are three cases to consider.
Case 1 There exists (ˆ v1, ˆ v2) ∈ P with minmaxg1 < ˆ v1 <g ∗
1 + ²/2, ˆ v2 > minmaxg2.
In this case it is possible to construct a pooling equilibrium in which player one
follows the automaton strategy, player two plays a strategy corresponding to (ˆ v1, ˆ v2), and
player one is minmaxed should she reveal herself. Consider the following strategies for
the normal types:
Equilibrium path. Player one follows the automaton strategy. Player two plays according
to ˆ h
ˆ t and from time ˆ t+1 onwards plays as in Lemma 2(ii) so that payoﬀs are within η of
(ˆ v1, ˆ v2), where η is deﬁned below.
Oﬀ equilibrium path. Any deviation is minmaxed by the other player.
“Oﬀ equilibrium path” means a history which has unconditional probability zero. In
this case, both types of player one follow the same pure strategy, and so any deviation
from this is punished by player two, who plays to minmax the normal type of player
one. Likewise the normal type of player one minmaxes player two should he deviate.
Any deviation by player two will result in an expected continuation payoﬀ of at most
(1 −µ)minmaxg2 +µ¯ g2 since with probability (1 −µ)h ew i l lb ef a c i n gt h en o r m a lt y p e
who will play a minmax strategy. Choose 0 < δ0
2 < 1, η0 > 0a n d¯ µ>0t os a t i s f y
(1 − δ
0
2)¯ g2 + δ
0






M−1(ˆ v2 − η
0)
where the L.H.S. is an upper bound on the deviation payoﬀ and the R.H.S. is a lower
b o u n do nt h ep a y o ﬀ from holding to the equilibrium strategy, given that deviation might
occur as early as the ﬁrst period, g2 may be received along ˆ h
ˆ t,a n dˆ t ≤ M −1. Likewise a
δ00
1 and an η00 can be found such that a corresponding inequality holds for player one (who
is minmaxed with probability one after deviation). Choose η = min{η0,η00} and letting
˜ δ be as in Lemma 2(ii), set ¯ δ = max{˜ δ,δ0
2,δ00
1}. Hence for ¯ δ < δ1,δ2 < 1, 0 <µ<¯ µ the
above strategies are feasible and constitute a Nash equilibrium.
16The formal proof of this lemma is purely technical and available from the authors upon request.
32Case 2 There exists (ˆ v1, ˆ v2) ∈ P with minmaxg1 ≥ ˆ v1 and ˆ v2 > minmaxg2,b u tn o
(v1,v 2) ∈ P with v1 > minmaxg1,v 2 > minmaxg2.
In this case a separating equilibrium will be constructed. Consider a best response
against the automaton starting in a state x ∈ Z which leads to a cycle of no more than
M periods. For high discount factors the payoﬀs generated by this must approximately
lie in P - see the corollary below - and hence in Case 2 oﬀer player one no more than her
minmax payoﬀ. This means that player one can be induced to reveal her type provided
she is rewarded by a strictly individually rational payoﬀ: if she mimics the automaton at
this point she would convince player two that he is playing against the automaton; player
two would therefore play a best-response which would give player one a lower payoﬀ than
she would get by revealing her type.
Lemma 2 There exists 1 > ˆ δ2 > 0 such that starting in any x ∈ Z,a n df o r1 > δ2 > ˆ δ2,
there exists a best response against the automaton strategy with cycle no more than M
which coincides with a best response in the zero discounting case, that is, which yields a
payoﬀ to player two of max(v1,v2)∈P v2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :Consider a best response with cycle K ≤ M starting from x ∈ Z,a n d
let the payoﬀs to player two in the cycle be g1
2,g2
2,...,gK
2 .D i s c o u n t e dp a y o ﬀs starting from
the ﬁrst point in the cycle are
g1
2 + δ2g2







which converges to the average payoﬀ (1/K)
PK
n=1 gn
2 as δ2 → 1. Since there are only a
ﬁnite number of such cycles, above a critical discount factor ¯ δ2 a best response cycle in
t h en o nd i s c o u n t i n gc a s em u s ta l s ob eab e s tr e s p o n s ec y c l ei nt h ed i s c o u n t i n gc a s e ;i t
thus corresponds to a point in P such that v2 is maximised. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2 As δ2 −→ 1, all continuation payoﬀs of player two from a best-response
against the automaton strategy at any x ∈ Z converge to argmax(v1,v2)∈Pv2.
Choose (ˆ v1, ˆ v2) ∈ V (δ1,δ2), 0 ≤ δ1,δ2 < 1, such that minmaxg1 < ˆ v1 <g ∗
1 + ²/2,
ˆ v2 > minmaxg2 (this is always possible by Case 2, Assumption 1, and the convexity of
V ). ¿From the corollary and by deﬁnition of Case 2 there exists a 0 < ˜ δ < 1s u c ht h a tf o r
1 > δ1,δ2 > ˜ δ there are best response payoﬀs( v∗
1,v∗
2)( d e p e n d i n go nδ1,δ2) starting from
ˆ h
ˆ t satisfying v∗
1 < ˆ v1 − α,f o rs o m eα > 0.
Consider the following strategies:
Equilibrium path. Both players follow ˆ h
ˆ t for the ﬁrst ˆ t − 1 periods. At time ˆ t player one
normal type reveals his type by playing some a
ˆ t
1 6=ˆ s1(ˆ h
ˆ t−1). Thereafter both play a Nash
33equilibrium of the complete information game between the normal types with payoﬀs
(ˆ v1, ˆ v2). If a
ˆ t
1 =ˆ s1(ˆ h
ˆ t−1) then player two plays a best response against the automaton
strategy as in Lemma 2.
Oﬀ equilibrium path. Deviations are minmaxed.
T h ei d e ai st or e w a r dp l a y e ro n ef o rr e v e a l i n gh e rt y p ew i t hap a y o ﬀ ˆ v1 and if she
mimics the automaton she receives a payoﬀ v∗
1 less than (or equal) her minmax payoﬀ.
These strategies are feasible, i.e., payoﬀs( ˆ v1, ˆ v2) can be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome in the complete information game for any discount factors (δ1,δ2), and addition-
ally with µ close to zero it will pay neither player to deviate - see the argument for Case 1
for player one; for player two the expected continuation payoﬀsa f t e rp e r i o dˆ t,c o m p a r e d
to the minmax threat if player one is the normal type, will prevent deviation during ˆ h
ˆ t
for µ small enough, and thereafter if player one follows the automaton strategy player
two cannot gain by deviating because he is by assumption playing a best response, and if
player one is revealed to be the normal type then the continuation game by assumption is
in equilibrium so deviations are not proﬁtable. Player one has a new deviation possibility
however: the option of mimicking the automaton at time ˆ t and thereafter; however, if
δ1,δ2 > ˜ δ,s h ew i l ls u ﬀer a loss of continuation payoﬀ of at least (ˆ v1 − v∗
1) > 0, which for
δ1 suﬃciently close to one will make this deviation unproﬁtable (likewise for deviations
after ﬁrst mimicking the automaton).
Finally, for δ1 near one, the overall payoﬀ to player one from adhering to the above
strategy is within ²
2 of the continuation payoﬀ after ˆ t,a n db yC a s e2ˆ v1 + ²
2 <g ∗
1 + ².
Hence there exist ¯ δ and ¯ µ such that for ¯ δ < δ1,δ2 < 1, 0 <µ<¯ µ the above strategies
are feasible and constitute a Nash equilibrium which gives player one a payoﬀ less than
g∗
1 + ².
Provided that P contains points strictly above minmaxg2 then P must fall into Case
1 or Case 2. This follows because otherwise there would be points (¯ v1, ¯ v2) ∈ P with
¯ v1 ≥ g∗
1 +²/2, ¯ v2 > minmaxg2. But then from Lemma 1 (iii) there is a point (˜ v1, ˜ v2) ∈ P
satisfying ˜ v1 ≤ g∗
1,˜ v2 ≥ minmaxg2. Hence there exists a convex combination of (¯ v1,¯ v2)
and (˜ v1, ˜ v2), belonging to P by Lemma 1(i), and satisfying Case 1. Finally there is:
Case 3 There does not exist (v1,v 2) ∈ P such that v2 > minmaxg2.
Again it will be demonstrated that a separating equilibrium can be constructed.
Lemma 3 For given δ1,δ2, after the history ˆ h
ˆ t there is a best response by player two
against the automaton which implies that, for all t>ˆ t + M − 1, at
1 is a minmax strategy
against player two and at
2 is such that g2(at
1,a t
2)=m i nm a xg2.
Proof: From ˆ t+1 onwards there exists a best response against the automaton which leads,
a f t e ra tm o s tM − 1 periods, to a cycle of length, say, K ≤ M. Suppose player one does
34not play a minmax strategy against player two every period in the cycle. Then, player
two’s best response must achieve a payoﬀ greater than minmaxg2. Since he can guarantee
himself at least his minmax payoﬀ in every period and sometimes gets strictly more, his
discounted average payoﬀ must be bigger than minmaxg2 - contradicting the deﬁnition
of case 3. Q.E.D.
It follows that, once the cycle starts, a best response strategy for player two is simply
any s h o r t - r u nb e s tr e s p o n s et ot h ea u t o m a t o na c t i o np e r i o db yp e r i o da st h i sg u a r a n t e e s
player two his minmax payoﬀ each period.
Note that by assumption 1 there exists (ˆ v1, ˆ v2) ∈ V (δ1,δ2), such that g∗
1 < ˆ v1 <
g∗
1 + ² and minmaxg2 < ˆ v2 for all 0 ≤ δ1,δ2 < 1. Using this payoﬀ vector a separating
equilibrium can be constructed as follows:
Equilibrium path. Both players follow ˆ h
ˆ t for the ﬁrst ˆ t − 1 periods. At time ˆ t player one
reveals his type by playing some a
ˆ t
1 6=ˆ s1(ˆ h
ˆ t−1). Thereafter both play a Nash equilibrium
of the complete information game between the normal types with payoﬀs( ˆ v1,ˆ v2). If
a
ˆ t
1 =ˆ s1(ˆ h
ˆ t−1) then thereafter player two plays a best response against the automaton
which after no more than M −1 periods speciﬁes each period the short-run best response
against the automaton action which minimises player one’s payoﬀ.
Oﬀ equilibrium path. Deviations are minmaxed.
As before, deviation from the above strategies is unproﬁtable when µ is close to zero
and δ1,δ2 are close to one. Mimicking the automaton from period ˆ t gives player one a
payoﬀ each period after ˆ t + M − 1 no greater than g∗
1 by deﬁnition of g∗
1,w h i c hm u s tb e
inferior to revelation and receipt of a continuation payoﬀ of ˆ v1 for δ1 near one. Hence
there exist ¯ δ and ¯ µ such that for ¯ δ < δ1,δ2 < 1, 0 <µ<¯ µ the above strategies are feasible
and constitute a Nash equilibrium which gives player one a payoﬀ less than g∗
1+². Q.E.D.
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